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Abstract 
The market mechanism of spatial resource allocation is examined in a system of cities, where 
social welfare depends on city size. The competitive dynamics of the system is a product of the 
interplay between people’s individual exit type choices (migration) and their collective voice 
type choices (urban governance). It is shown that the use of efficiency enhancing measures of 
urban governance depends on the pressure of exit. A necessary condition for dynamic 
efficiency is that the market equilibrium of migration is non-stable, which sounds somewhat 
paradoxical. Dynamic efficiency is more likely to emerge between initially small cities, in 
which agglomeration economies dominate, than between initially large cities, in which 
agglomeration diseconomies dominate. The incentives for proper urban governance are 
somewhat ambiguous in the most relevant case, where cities are of asymmetric size. It is 
therefore important to strengthen the incentives by means of national urban policy.  
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1 Introduction 
In the past few years internal migration has been lively in Finland as a reflection of 
globalisation and interEuropean economic integration. The still ongoing structural 
change from rural economy towards urban economy has been shifting the locational 
advantages of the Finnish production sector from rural areas to urban areas. At the 
present stage of development, the focus of the migration pattern has turned from rural-
urban migration to inter-city migration. The fact that market forces now determine the 
location patterns of firms and people more directly than before, and that the elements 
of welfare nowadays lie in urban surroundings urges the need for economic research 
concerning the concepts of spatial market adjustment, national urban policy and local 
urban governance.  
 
People and firms are the key market agents of spatial reformation of the economy. 
This aspect is well covered by the literature on regional economics and urban 
economics. The market mechanism is based on welfare and profit maximising choices 
of location, and on agglomeration economies and diseconomies that connect these 
choices to community size. However, as collectives of their residents, the 
communities can also be regarded as market agents in the reformation process. The 
competitive role of the communities is emphasised in the more recent literature on 
local public economics.  
 
An early version of a comprehensive treatment that combines, at least implicitly, the 
above-mentioned elements of migration, optimal community size and competitive 
governance is the Tiebout model (Tiebout, 1956). The model is a well-known 
representation of competitive public good provision, or to put it more fundamentally, 
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of efficient allocation of resources in a spatial context. The model is constructed on 
two cornerstones, inter-community migration of people seeking better local public 
services, and competition of the communities for the migrants through attractive tax-
service packages. The eventual outcome is a Pareto optimal equilibrium, where 
nobody can gain by moving to another community.   
 
In the original Tiebout model, the role of competition is sketched very briefly to rest 
on the implicit analogy between communities and private firms as competitive market 
agents. The focus is on competition of residents between the communities. The 
Tiebout model is essentially a demand side model that says little about the supply 
side, and nothing about the production technology of the localities or the political 
process inside them (Rubinfeld, 1987, p. 174). This paper attempts to elaborate 
Tiebout’s intuition further by exploring the rationale and preconditions of inter-
community competition by turning the focus on the competitive pressures that emerge 
within the communities. The welfare of the residents in a community is taken to be 
determined by the size of the community on the one hand, and on the actions of the 
community itself on the other hand. A simple club theoretic framework consisting of a 
system of urban areas, henceforth called cities, is used. The model is further extended 
from that of Tiebout by including the outcomes of private goods and factor markets 
and the quality of life in people’s welfare considerations, and by taking the conditions 
of the local private markets into the sphere of public influence.  
 
The evolution of the system of cities is studied from the viewpoint of people’s 
choices. Clustering of the firms is an essential source of agglomeration economies, 
but the firm sector is for simplicity ignored by assuming that the profit maximising 
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choices of the firms respond competitively to the evolution of the local markets, and 
that they are effectively reflected by the parameters of the budget constraint faced by 
the people. People make their choices between and within the cities. Between the 
cities people make their choices by exit, that is, by voting with their feet between 
residential sites. Within the cities people make their choices by voice, which is to say 
that they take democratic and other collective actions so as to affect the local 
preconditions of their welfare. The collective mode of people’s decision-making is the 
origin of what is here called urban governance. It is also assumed that the preferences 
of the city residents are effectively revealed on the average by means of local 
democracy, and that they are carried out undistortedly by the local bureaucracy.  
 
Exit-type choices are close but not equal to normal market choices. In private goods 
and factor markets the market agents exert exit between preferred and non-preferred 
items, and they choose optimal amounts of the preferred ones. Residential choices are 
different, because people are not able to carry out the second stage of decision-making 
– they can not optimise on the amount that is the size of the city, which indirectly 
determines their utility in the city. Furthermore, exit-type choices are made according 
to average, not marginal concepts, as they are made in the market case. Therefore, exit 
does not suffice to secure efficient market outcomes in a general sense (Atkinson & 
Stiglitz, 1982). However, by raising their voice the residents of a city are collectively 
able to optimise on the size of the city. In collective decision-making, the problem of 
marginal vs. average choice criteria is also irrelevant (Cornes & Sandler, 1998).  
 
The necessary condition of allocative efficiency is that all market agents operate in a 
technically efficient manner. As is well established in the standard theory of the firm, 
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competition is the main motor of technical efficiency. Competitive dynamics in the 
system of cities precludes external pressure to evoke technical efficiency within the 
cities as in the case of competing firms. At first glance the analogy seems to be 
straightforward - the threat of emigration (exit) should force the cities to efficient 
conduct of urban governance (voice) just as firms have to respond to declining market 
shares with better efficiency. The situation, however, is more complicated. In the 
following chapters the nature of competitive dynamics of the system of cities is 
examined in close detail. An analogy between the position of private firms and that of 
the cities is sought. 
 
2 The basic model  
2.1 Agglomeration economies and welfare 
A conventional postulation in the literature of urban economics is that welfare in a 
city depends on its size (Alonso, 1971). This is because household, business and 
social agglomeration economies (and diseconomies) that arise in densely populated 
urban surroundings determine both the benefits and the costs of urban life 
(Richardson, 1979, p. 306). This classification points to the fact that locally 
experienced welfare depends on the efficiency of the activities of the firms and the 
local public sector in the city. In this paper, the setting is simplified by assuming that 
the firm sector is competitive and adjusts efficiently to the respective circumstances, 
and only the private and collective actions of the households are studied. 
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The optimisation problem of a site-seeking household can be stated as a standard 
consumer’s choice by assuming that the household agglomeration economies are 
experienced directly on the benefit side (in the utility function), and that the business 
and social agglomeration economies are faced indirectly on the cost side (in the 
budget constraint) (compare to Richardson, 1973, pp. 11-20). The direct benefits of 
urban location are anticipated in everyday life, and the arguments of the utility 
function include quantities of private goods, public goods and leisure. The quality of 
life can also be included in the leisure variable. Agglomeration economies enter as 
technical externalities. The costs of urban life, described by the budget constraint, are 
determined by local factor prices, particularly wages on the income side, and by 
commodity prices, transportation costs, local taxes and tariffs etc. on the expenditure 
side. Here agglomeration economies work indirectly through the price mechanism, 
and are thus pecuniary in nature. Because of agglomeration economies, both the 
benefits and the costs are implicitly determined by the size of the city. (Mills & 
Hamilton, 1984; McCann, 2001.)  
 
In the spirit of constrained utility maximization the welfare anticipated by an average 
citizen is determined by the net sum of benefits and costs of urban life. A standard 
assumption is that agglomeration economies dominate the formation of welfare in the 
earlier stages of city growth, but that agglomeration diseconomies gain strength with 
growth and eventually become dominant (Richardson, 1973). Figure 1 illustrates the 
basic assumptions. 
 
(Figure 1 about here) 
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In Figure 1, city size is measured by the number of people (denoted by n) within the 
geographical area of the city. This is reasonable if the geography is taken as given in 
the short term. In the figure two sets of curves are presented. The curve AWp = Wp/n, 
where Wp is potential total welfare, plots the potential average welfare consisting of 
the net sum of benefits and costs in the city considered. The term potential refers to 
full utilisation of the existing welfare creation ‘technology’ of a city. The technology 
itself is taken as given and innovations that change it are ignored. In this sense, the 
AWp curve resembles the curve of the attainable profits of a competitive firm, or the 
production possibility frontier of an economy. The curve MWp = dWp/dn plots the 
potential marginal net benefits that new migrants bring to total welfare in the city. The 
MWp curve strikes through the AWp curve from above at no, where the latter reaches 
its maximum point. At that point, agglomeration diseconomies start to dominate 
agglomeration economies.  
 
The other set of curves in Figure 1, namely AW and MW, plots the actually observed 
average welfare in the city. Due to market distortions and excess transaction costs in 
the local private sector and inefficiencies in the local public sector, the actual 
observations may lie far below the welfare potential of the city (Brueckner, 1982). 
This reflects inefficient utilisation of the existing welfare creation technology. The 
observation of welfare is the only relevant information. In Figure 1, at city size n1, the 
average citizen observes welfare AW1, while the theoretical potential would be AWp1. 
Denoting the gap between potential and actual welfare by g, the total welfare worth of 
g times n1 remains unexperienced in the city. This is the dead weight loss of 
remaining below the potential of the city. Furthermore, np > no would be the optimal 
population if the full potential were reached. 
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 Since both the benefit side and the cost side are determined by the size of the locality, 
the number of the population should be a true choice variable in the optimisation of 
the households, but it is evident that the households cannot choose optimal population 
such as no or np in Figure 1. Therefore, the maximisation problem for an average 
household stated above actually is the problem of a social planner. For this reason 
(among other things) the city must now also be studied from the point of view of 
collective choice. 
 
2.2 The role of urban governance 
Urban governance concerns a broad range of public activities that affect the 
preconditions of welfare in the city (Bailey, 1999). The essential feature here is that 
urban governance is based on collective decision-making - the citizens make their 
collective choices by voice, that is, via local democracy. A benchmark case for 
efficient urban governance is the following: the distribution of welfare in the city is 
symmetrical, the local public expenditures are financed by lump sum taxes, and the 
local bureaucracy operates without bias. Then, the welfare of the median voter 
represents average welfare, and a simple majority-voting rule produces a Pareto-
optimal outcome. It is obvious that these features are quite specific in nature. (Cullis 
& Jones, 1998, pp. 78-87.)  
 
Urban governance can be divided into reactive and proactive functions. In the reactive 
sense urban governance is operated on a short-term basis with the prevailing 
circumstances taken as given. The focus is on the observed changes in the average 
welfare - systematic migration into the city may increase or decrease the welfare of 
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the existing residents. From this perspective, the main function of urban governance is 
the optimization of population. In Figure 1 population no is chosen along the AW 
schedule as a true short-term solution to the consumer’s problem depicted above.  
 
There are some limits to the horizontal optimisation of population. Aiming at no from 
left to right is out of compass, because that depends on the exogenous exit decisions 
of potential newcomers. Aiming at no from right to left may also be difficult to 
implement, at least if the civil and property rights of the current residents are 
respected. The function can be operated in practice only by allowing entrance to the 
city up to no (or other stipulated population level) and closing entrance at that size. 
The operative measures include planning, zoning, housing policy and dimensioning of 
public services. The reactive optimisation of population is broadly discussed in the 
literature on urban economics and it is also in common use in practice. The 
optimisation criteria, however, are often other (say, real estate values) than that used 
in this paper. (Brueckner, 1982.) 
  
The proactive function of urban governance concerns full utilisation of the welfare 
potential of the city. In terms of Figure 1 this refers to bridging the gap between 
potential and actually observed welfare by shifting the observation AW1 vertically 
closer to the potential AWp1, and refining the shape of the AW curve to follow that of 
the AWp curve. Proactive urban governance takes care of the technical efficiency of 
the city as an economic unit. Just as in the case of profit maximising private firms in 
competitive markets the survival of a city depends on its technical efficiency. The 
proactive functions of urban governance include competition policy, structural policy 
and growth policy. 
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 The concept of competition policy refers here to improvements in the efficiency of the 
local public and private sectors. Recalling the above benchmark for efficient urban 
governance, efficiency in the public sector must be secured through decision-making, 
financing and execution of service production. It is well stated in the literature of 
collective decision-making that in practice Pareto-efficient outcomes are seldom 
reached by majority voting. The decision-making methods must be developed to 
ensure that urban governance is properly steered by the preferences of local residents. 
The promises of new technology have received attention in this respect. In public 
finance, distortive proportional and progressive taxes are much more familiar in 
practice than undistortive lump sum taxes. Refinements of tax systems, applications 
of marginal cost pricing and charging policies are examples of financial reforms. The 
executive problems of bureaucracy are well known. Standard means of improving the 
efficiency of service provision include privatisation, monitoring, deregulation, 
competitive bidding, purchaser-provider arrangements etc. (Bailey, 1999.) 
 
Proactive urban governance also concerns the efficiency of the local private sector 
because it has a vital role in the functioning of the local commodity and factor 
markets (Prud’homme & Lee, 1999). Urban governance can notably affect both the 
market distortions faced by the competitive firm sector and the overall transaction 
costs in the city. As a key constructor of local technical and social infrastructure, 
urban governance can also contribute to the formation of local social capital, which 
has a catalyst role in motoring up innovation, and a pre-emptive role in establishing a 
fruitful economic environment (Kajanoja & Simpura, 2000). On the technical side, the 
instruments include zoning and city planning and systems of public transport, logistics 
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and networks, which have considerable effects on the time and money costs of market 
transactions in the city. As to social infrastructure, the instruments include immaterial 
networks and recreational, cultural and other such facilities.  
 
Structural policy means motoring up and co-ordinating reallocation of local resources 
from sunset industries to sunrise ones. The main instrument in this respect is strategic 
programming. Traditional measures include focusing of local budget funds and 
external funding in order to evoke economic incentives for warranted development. 
More modern modes of local structural policy aim to amalgamate the mutual interests 
of the community and local private business life into joint efforts of strategic 
development (Bailey, 1999).  
 
Growth policy is about setting long-term size (or growth rate) targets. As it is the 
density of population that determines agglomeration economies and welfare, both the 
geographical area and population of the city must be controlled. Regarding 
geographical optimisation, recall that the AW schedules in Figure 1 are drawn for a 
given area. For areas of different sizes the curves may look different. If 
economies/diseconomies of scale exist, the AW curve can be made to reach a higher 
peak value by widening/narrowing the city area. The area must be chosen so that the 
long-run average welfare is maximised. Instruments of geographical optimisation 
include municipal consolidations, federations, and regional co-operation in service 
production and development. Long-term optimisation of population is then about 
choosing welfare-maximising population along the proper AWp schedule. The same 
operational notions apply as in the reactive mode of urban governance, and the 
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instruments are mostly the same, too. As is demonstrated later, proper conduct of this 
function is vital for the efficiency of the whole system of cities. 
 
To conclude, voice-driven urban governance is operated under the pressure of exit-
type migration decisions. Reactive optimisation of population is a response to inward 
migration. It is easy to defend the welfare of the original citizens by stopping planning 
for new housing and services just before the requested city size is reached. The 
decision is politically neutral, at least if the preferences of the median voter equal 
those of the average household. In the median voter model the outcome is also 
welfare maximizing in the short term. Reactive urban governance resembles firms’ 
short-term optimisation on production according to market parameters. The effort of 
applying the proactive functions needs pressure from the threat of outward migration. 
This is because implementation of these functions affects the present residents of the 
city. Equity considerations arise because more efficient tax and transfer policies treat 
people unequally, structural reallocation of resources causes unemployment in some 
industries, revisions in city planning and public transport systems capitalize in real 
estate values, and so on. The likelihood of political conflicts is high, and the costs of 
collective decision-making increase (Cullis & Jones, 198, pp. 82-83).  There is again 
an analogy to private firms: the powerful example of dynamic inefficiency of a 
monopoly suggests that such of internal renewals are accepted only under 
considerable market pressure (Bailey, 1999, pp. 98-100). Let us now make the 
pressure of inter-city migration exit explicit in the analysis.  
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 3 Inter-city migration and competitive dynamics   
3.1 Large cities 
Assume first that the economy consists of a system of initially large and 
homogeneous cities. Let the number of cities be m, and let the total population be N. 
People are perfectly mobile and fully informed about the welfare observations 
everywhere, and migration between cities emerges if welfare differentials are found. 
This is a standard assumption, and the introduction of mobility costs and uncertainty 
in welfare comparisons would not change the basic intuition. Figure 2 below 
illustrates this standard setting. In the figure, the MW curves as well as the AWp and 
MWp curves are ignored for simplicity. 
 
(Figure 2 about here) 
 
In Figure 2 two of the identical cities, city A and city B, are presented. The curves 
AWi, i = A,B, plot average welfare in the cities, drawn from left to right for city A and 
from right to left for city B. Since all cities are identical the length of the horizontal 
axis is the share of the two particular cities A and B of the whole population N, 
namely n = nA + nB = 2N/m, where nA and nB denote the number of residents in A and 
B respectively. The households make their choices according to observations along 
the AWi curves.  
 
Assume that the total population is initially divided so that the number of people in A 
and B are OAn1 and OBn1 respectively. At this stage, there exists an observed welfare 
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gap, denoted by g, in favour of city A. People are induced to move from city B to city 
A. Migration narrows the gap because of two effects. First, migration into A enforces 
agglomeration diseconomies in A, which lowers benefits and raises costs causing 
average welfare in A to fall. Second, migration from city B decreases agglomeration 
diseconomies in B, which increases welfare for those who remain in B. Continued 
migration leads to a stable equilibrium at point e, where welfare in both cities is 
equalised and no motives for further migration exist. In the equilibrium, the size of 
city A is nA = OAne and the size of city B is nB = OBne. It is evident from the figure and 
from the above definition of n that nA = nB = N/m. The equilibrium is also efficient, 
because social welfare, consisting of the area O  is at its maximum. For 
any other value of n there would be welfare losses. Note that in this individualistic 
way of welfare measurement the problem of inter-city externalities and other reasons 
for paternalistic welfare judgements are ignored (Boadway & Bruce, 1984).  
B
e
B
e
AA OAWAW
 
However, the market solution of Figure 2 is efficient only in the static sense. Since the 
AWi curves in the figure present observed welfare, assumed to remain below the 
respective potentials, welfare improvement through higher technical efficiency is 
possible. The question now is whether there is such a competitive pressure in the 
system that would provoke improvements in technical efficiency in the cities as there 
is in the case of private firms operating in competitive markets. The competitive 
pressure needed for improvements in efficiency is generated by exit. Since the 
equilibrium at e is a stable position with zero welfare differentials, there exists no 
such pressure at that point. People are not on the move and urban governance is not 
forced into inconvenient improvements in technical efficiency. The case of a stable 
market equilibrium does not seem to imply high efficiency in the dynamic sense. 
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 In order to gain deeper insight into the dynamic properties of a stable market solution 
it is useful to examine an alternative equilibrium path recalling the option of static 
urban governance. Reconsider the starting point n1 in Figure 2, where migration from 
B to A makes those who remain in B better off but those who originally live in A 
worse off. Because the initial residents of A anticipate that in-migration will reduce 
their welfare, they may be induced to raise their voice at that moment. The simplest 
thing they can do to avoid the welfare loss is to adopt reactive urban governance and 
close entrance to city A at n1. Now, migration is unable to level up the welfare gap g. 
For city B, the gap can be bridged only by the means of proactive urban governance. 
The residents in city B may raise their voice in favour of developing the use of 
welfare creating technology. This is illustrated by the upward shift of the AWB curve 
to AW’B. It must be noted, however, that city B is not forced to do this – there is no 
threat of exit because people cannot migrate to city A. Another notable implication is 
that there is no great urgency for improvements in city A even if the average welfare 
in B should increase above that of A at n1. This is because migration to B would 
benefit both A and B.  
 
If city B manages to improve its technical efficiency, the welfare of the whole system 
increases somewhat. This is because B moves closer to its potential, and the original 
residents of B become better off. However, the situation is still sub-optimal if no 
improvements in technical efficiency in city A have occurred. On the other hand, if 
city B is not able to improve its efficiency, the welfare of the whole system remains 
lower than in the market solution at point e. The general conclusion is that the 
equilibrium at point e’ is basically stable just like that at point e, and no exit-driven 
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competitive pressure exists to draw the AWi curves closer to their potential 
counterparts.  
 
3.2 Small cities 
The above analysis confirms the standard result that with free migration there is a case 
for a stable market equilibrium. However, because of low incentives for 
improvements in technical efficiency this equilibrium may well remain dynamically 
sub-optimal. The result holds in the case of large cities, which operate on the falling 
regimes of their average (and marginal) welfare schedules.  It is worthwhile also to 
analyse the case in which the cities in the system are initially small and agglomeration 
economies dominate. This is also the situation that is more relevant in practice, at 
least in a national perspective. Figure 3 depicts this case. 
 
(Figure 3 about here) 
 
In Figure 3 the setting is changed from that of Figure 2 by assuming that the system 
now consists of a considerably larger number of cities m’>m, while the total 
population N is taken to be unchanged. Therefore, in any representative city, the 
number of residents must now be smaller, or, to put it in other words, the horizontal 
axis must be shorter with respect to the AW (and MW) schedules.  
 
Reconsider the situation of welfare equalisation presented by point e in Figure 3.  
With small cities, point e is evidently not a stable market equilibrium. Suppose that, 
for purely stochastic reasons, some households move from city A to city B, and that 
the allocation of people shifts from ne to n1. A welfare gap g0 is opened in favour of 
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B. In this case, migration does not level up the gap - in fact it draws the gap even 
wider and makes the solution to deviate from e at an accelerating rate. The only stable 
market equilibrium in this case would be a corner solution, in which either city A or 
city B, depending on the direction of the initial stochastic shock, is deserted. 
 
In the non-stable migration pattern reactive urban governance is of no use. Closing 
entrance does not help to stop out-migration from city A, and city B does not want to 
cut the beneficial in-migration. The incentive structure of urban governance is now 
changed from that in Figure 2. In Figure 3, migration from city A to city B makes the 
old and new residents of city B better off because of rising agglomeration economies, 
but the residents remaining in city A become worse off because of decreasing 
agglomeration economies. The residents of the out-migration city now suffer, and 
thus face the pressure of exit. Proactive urban governance is to be considered. 
 
Under the pressure of accelerating exit by their fellow citizen, the more reluctantly 
moving residents of city A raise their voice in favour of competition policy and 
structural policy.  Figure 3 illustrates how improvements in local efficiency shift 
average welfare in A up to  so as to bridge the welfare gap g'AAW
AW
0. At e1, average 
welfare in both cities is again equalised. Assume that city A now looks even more 
attractive compared to city B at the marginal, and migration turns backwards resulting 
in e2. A welfare gap g1 is now opened in favour of city A. People in city B have to 
respond to this by expressing their desire for efficiency improvements, which results 
in an upward shift of AWB to . If migrants are now attracted to city B, people in 
city A will again be forced to achieve further improvements. The process continues in 
'
B
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consecutive order. As a result of proactive urban governance in both cities, the 
actually observed welfare levels converge to their potential counterparts. 
 
In principle, the competition for migrants between A and B will continue as long as 
welfare gains can be created by improvements in technical efficiency. In the long-
term all cities will go through the evolution illustrated in Figure 3. After reaching 
their potential welfare curves, the cities can no longer compete for new residents by 
improving technical efficiency. At this stage, the non-stable nature of the solution 
appears confusing, and a reasonable question is whether an efficient market outcome 
is at all possible in the long run.  
 
Proactive growth policy now comes into the picture. All cities optimise on their 
geographical area and choose their population so as to maximise the average welfare 
in that area (Ng, 1973). Those cities that manage to attract people allow migrants to 
enter until average welfare in the city reaches its maximum. After that, entrance is 
closed. The remaining cities will continue the competition. Some of them attract 
people and some lose them. The number of cities is endogenously determined in the 
long run. The mechanism continues until there is an optimal number of cities all 
having an optimal population. The cities may turn out to be heterogeneous with 
homogeneous population in them. Ignoring the integer problem, all people in every 
city enjoy maximal welfare and nobody wants to migrate. The solution is socially 
Pareto efficient since nobody’s welfare could be improved without making somebody 
else worse off. (Cornes & Sandler, 1986.) The famous rank-size rule (or Zipf’s law) 
of ‘natural’ size distribution of cities can be regarded to reflect this kind of 
development (McCann, 2001, p. 79). 
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 The above general equilibrium solution, of course, remains hypothetical and the social 
costs of the evolution process may be significant in practice. The dismal fact is that 
some cities are doomed to be deserted and at least some infrastructure must be 
relocated as far as total population is taken as fixed. The problem of depopulation can 
be avoided by taking total population endogenous. The rural sector or other countries, 
ignored in the above analysis, can to some extent serve as a population reserve in this 
respect. But if there is not such an effective reserve, social costs may arise. If the 
indivisible costs of demographic and economic decline fall mainly on the residents of 
the declining cities, the migration rate may be biased to exceed that of the ‘natural’ 
rate of depreciation of the infrastructure. The focus regarding the problem of sunk 
costs is on the speed of the adjustment.   
 
3.3 Asymmetric cities 
So far the discussion has focused on symmetric situations along falling or rising 
average welfare schedules in both cities alike. In practice, there are often cities in both 
positions at the same time. Another rather restrictive assumption made above is the 
assumption of homogeneity of the welfare schedules between cities. Due to various 
geographical, historical, institutional, structural and other reasons, the welfare 
schedules of the cities may well be different from each other even in the longer term. 
The economic preconditions of the cities are quite unilateral, especially in recently 
industrialized countries, like Finland. For practical reasons, it is most reasonable to 
take these asymmetries into account in the analysis. 
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Figure 4 below illustrates the essentials of the case of asymmetric cities. In the figure, 
the AW curves for cities A and B are again presented, but city A is now assumed to be 
initially a more fertile city with higher average welfare around the peak value than in 
city B. The AW curves are drawn to reflect the difference. The AW curves intersect at 
two points, namely at e and e’ in order to demonstrate all the remaining variations of 
possible outcomes.  
 
(Figure 4 about here) 
 
At the intersection point e in Figure 4, city A is initially large as compared to city B. 
City A is on its falling welfare regime due to high agglomeration diseconomies, 
whereas agglomeration economies dominate in city B. Just as in the case of large 
cities above, it is obvious that point e is basically a stable market equilibrium. 
Consider first allocations right from e. There is a welfare gap attracting people from A 
to B. The adjustment will result in a stable market solution at e. Since migration is 
beneficial to both A and B, and the adjustment levels up the welfare gap, no notable 
incentives for raising voice exist in either city. As to allocations left from e, say at n1, 
there is a welfare gap that draws people from B to A towards a stable solution at point 
e. This would be inconvenient for both A and B. If city A now closes entrance at n1, 
city B can respond by the effort of proactive urban governance. If the effort is 
sufficient to level up the welfare gap so that  is reached, the system ends up at a 
stable equilibrium at n
'
BAW
1. It must be noted that residential reallocations leftwards from 
e would improve social welfare even without dynamic improvements in B. The 
incentive structure reduces to that of the case of large cities. Incentives for dynamic 
improvements in efficiency are weak around the stable intersection point e. 
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 At the other end in Figure 4, point e’ presents a more promising case, where city B is 
large and city A is small. Agglomeration economies dominate in A and diseconomies 
dominate in B. The solution at point e’ is non-stable, since starting from e’ in either 
direction opens up exploding welfare gaps. If, for stochastic reasons, migration should 
start leftwards from e’, both cities would lose welfare. In this direction, the large city 
B can and most probably will stop the loss of its residents’ welfare by closing 
entrance. With entrance to B closed, city A may try to level up the welfare gap by 
proactive urban governance, but again it is not the pressure of exit that necessitates 
this. The possibility of closing entrance makes e’ stable leftwards.  
 
If migration should turn rightwards from e’ in Figure 4, that is, if people should move 
from B to A, both cities would gain welfare. City A gains because of increased 
agglomeration economies and B gains because of decreased diseconomies. The case 
can be interpreted as one in which a small modern city attracts people from a larger 
city with a less developed industrial structure. Because there is now an ever-
expanding welfare gap, the point e’ is unstable in nature. In city A there certainly is 
no apparent need for raising voice, but in city B the incentives for urban governance 
are somewhat more ambiguous. The incentives rise because of the accelerating out-
migration and expanding welfare gap, but the incentives are dampened by the fact that 
the welfare of the still remaining citizens is boosted in any case.  
 
To get an idea of the dynamics, suppose that migration from B to A continues as such 
rightwards from e’ until the allocation nA* is reached. At this moment the need for 
urban governance becomes apparent in city A: city A adopts the reactive mode and 
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closes entrance to optimize on its population. This eliminates the pressure of exit, but 
leaves a wide welfare gap open. Suppose also that even without immediate pressure of 
exit city B succeeds in implementing proactive urban governance and manages to 
level up the welfare gap at point e” in Figure 4. At this stage, the competitive 
dynamics of the system depends on the shape of the average welfare schedule of city 
B. In Figure 4, the upwards-shifted average welfare curve  has a positive slope 
at n
"
BAW
A*. This is to say that city B has managed to implement a major reform regarding 
the effects of agglomeration economies. In this case the solution e” is non-stable, and 
the system moves to a dynamically efficient general equilibrium just as in the case of 
small cities presented above. This is because, left from point e”, both cities would 
gain welfare from in-migration and are therefore forced to improve their technical 
efficiency to attract the migrants. But, if the  schedule would slope downwards at 
n
"
BAW
A* (as presented by the broken line version of the average welfare curve), there is no 
threat of exit, and point e” remains a stable and dynamically sub-optimal solution.  
 
To sum up the findings, competitive incentives for improving technical efficiency are 
generally rather weak in the case of asymmetric cities. The incentives may remain too 
shallow to force the costly and inconvenient measures of proactive urban governance 
to be applied. Dynamic efficiency is likely to occur only in the case of a genuinely 
non-stable market solution. Such a situation is possible as a special case, where there 
is a welfare gap in favour of the initially small city (rightwards from point e’ in Figure 
4). However, dynamic efficiency rests on two rather restrictive preconditions. First, 
the large out-migration city should improve its technical efficiency even though it 
gains welfare from the outflow (moving from e’ to e” in Figure 4). Second, the 
improvement in technical efficiency must be substantial enough to make the effects of 
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agglomeration economies more positive at the margin than those in the rival city (the 
average welfare curve must be upwards sloping at point e” in Figure 4). This is to say 
that the optimal size of city B should be far beyond its short-term optimum nB*.  
 
The above observation stresses the importance of national level policy: the 
shallowness of the incentive structure must be enforced. Furthermore, it is not only 
that the larger cities must be encouraged to use proactive urban governance, but the 
focus must be placed on heavy structural reforms that motor up the effects of 
agglomeration economies. In the case of an initially large city the necessary reform 
sounds major but not impossible considering the disposable resources. The large cities 
must be motivated to grow even larger beyond their short-term optimality 
considerations. This benefits not only the cities themselves but also the entire society, 
because it facilitates competitive dynamics and, consequently, dynamic efficiency in 
the city system. 
 
4 Conclusions 
The analysis complements the message of the Tiebout model of spatial resource 
allocation by investigating the preconditions of competitive dynamics in a system of 
cities. In the present model agglomeration economies explain the connection between 
city size and welfare, and local welfare is maximised by urban governance (voice) 
under the market pressure created by migration (exit). The dynamic efficiency of the 
spatial system rests on the interplay of exit and voice. The incentives for dynamic 
improvements depend on the competitive nature of the system. In this respect, the 
cases of small and asymmetric cities are insightful. 
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 Urban governance is divided into reactive and proactive functions. The reactive 
function is short-term optimisation of population, operated by closing entrance into 
the city. This function resembles the profit maximising production decisions of firms. 
It can be implemented in a simple manner without notable political conflicts. 
Proactive urban governance concerns long-term improvement in the utilisation of the 
welfare-creating technology of the city. This function is analogous to the 
reorganisation of a firm’s operative practices in utilising the available production 
technology. Implementation of this function necessitates considerable effort and is 
due to evoke inconvenient equity and other such considerations. Therefore, it is 
undertaken only under competitive pressure.  
 
A somewhat paradoxical finding is that dynamic efficiency in a system of cities 
precludes non-stable migration patterns. In stable market situations the competitive 
dynamics remain partial and sub-optimality of resource allocation results in dynamic 
sense, because there is no pressure of exit to compel the cities to use proactive urban 
governance. Stability depends on the initial stage of utilisation of agglomeration 
economies. If all cities are initially large, meaning that agglomeration diseconomies 
dominate in all cities, the market solution is stable in nature. This is also true in the 
case of asymmetric cities, particularly if the larger cities implement reactive 
optimisation of population. The market situation is clearly non-stable if all cities are 
initially small, i.e. that agglomeration economies dominate everywhere, and both the 
cities that gain and those that lose population are forced to make improvements in 
their technical efficiency. Non-stable market situations also exist in an important 
special case, where small modern cities draw people from larger traditional cities, in 
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which agglomeration diseconomies dominate. In these two cases there is a close 
enough analogy to private firms operating in competitive markets. 
 
Reactive urban governance is a major cause of stability, because closing entrance into 
in-migration cities eliminates the pressure of exit in the out-migration cities. If 
population is optimised with reference to average welfare below the potential capacity 
of the city, the outcome is socially sub-optimal in the dynamic sense, and in most 
cases also in the static sense. Optimisation of population is socially beneficial only 
when connected to long-term growth policy. Optimal population targets should 
therefore be set only with reference to long-term welfare potentials to ensure the 
efficiency of the long-term general equilibrium in the city system. It is clear, however, 
that this function remains utterly theoretical in practice. From the social point of view, 
optimisation of population must be considered very critically. 
 
The analysis provides a clear-cut principle for national urban policy. On the one hand 
urban policy must work indirectly to enhance the working of the market mechanism. 
In this respect the pressure of exit must be strengthened and proper conduct of voice 
must be encouraged. The pressure of exit can be enforced by social and institutional 
reforms that enhance the mobility of people and remove distortions from the price 
mechanism that steers residential choices. To enable better conduct of voice the 
autonomous position of the cities as true market agents must be strengthened with 
particular emphasis on the implementation of proactive instruments of urban 
governance. Sufficient fiscal and administrative autonomy must be assigned to 
economically arranged urban areas. The Finnish system of highly autonomous local 
governments is basically a solid ground for such development. The urban areas must 
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be made to understand that they do not compete with smaller places and rural areas – 
they compete with each other for the welfare increasing migrants, and the competition 
is becoming more and more international in nature. Therefore, the welfare potential 
and growth of the largest cities is of particular importance. Short-term optimisation of 
population must be prohibited and the cities must be motivated to concentrate on 
proactive urban governance. Harsh structural take-offs must be encouraged especially 
in large cities with a traditional and possibly outdated industrial structure, and which 
seem to be reluctant to adopt newcomers. 
 
On the other hand national urban policy has direct functions. The market-oriented 
mechanism cannot handle important issues such as inter-regional externalities and 
equity. Traditionally the negative externalities have been of major concern, but 
nowadays the positive externalities attached e.g. to education, research, health care, 
and to the formation on social capital in general have received more and more 
attention. Furthermore, as was indicated above, proactive urban governance quite 
evidently raises up considerations of vertical equity. Horizontal equity among cities 
and regions, which has traditionally been a central element in the Finnish welfare 
state, can be endangered, too. All these issues must be dealt with in the framework of 
fiscal federalism, and clearly national level functions have to be compassed directly 
by means of urban policy.  
 
The above conclusions are of particular interest in Finland. In the present stage of 
globalisation and economic integration, the Finnish economy must compete against 
the circumstances on the European single market. The former comparative 
advantages, largely attached to the rural sector, have shifted to the new absolute 
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advantages of the urban economy. The important role of agglomeration economies 
has become evident, which is also reflected in the recent trend towards concentration. 
Moreover, the undeniable handicap caused by geography and climate stresses the fact 
that spatial factors carry more and more weight in the determination of absolute 
advantages. In a northern country, the costs of housing and transportation are high 
compared to European rivals. Therefore, the traditional element of agglomeration 
economies, that is the economics of scale and scope in constructing the inter- and 
intra-urban infrastructure, is still of particular importance. The fact that the 
development of the Finnish urban sector must be promoted has also been recognised 
in the recently introduced national urban policy. The policy is constructed to rest on 
the intrinsic development of economically determined urban areas, and aims at deeper 
integration of the communities in those areas. So far there has been insufficient 
political courage to focus the national urban policy on the issue of city size.  
 
In the light of the above analysis, the issue of city size, measured both in terms of 
population and geographic area, seems to be of immense importance to Finnish urban 
policy and urban governance. Finnish cities vary in size and in their economic, 
historic, geographic and other such determinants, but nevertheless they are all small 
and newborn in international comparison, and are scattered over a large country. Even 
the most rapidly growing urban areas are geographically wide and their population 
densities remain low.  
 
From the above perspective, at least four questions for further research can be 
formulated. First, there is need to evaluate the present practices of urban policy and 
urban governance. The Finnish urban policy quite ambitiously aims at developing a 
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wide range of very broadly defined urban areas, and the policy of some central cities 
seems to be quite negative regarding the adoption of newcomers. It could be argued 
that a higher degree of concentration would be needed to yield significant 
agglomeration economies. The assignment of responsibilities between national urban 
policy and local urban governance must be clarified. Second, the positive feature that 
the Finnish cities are comparatively autonomous fiscally and administratively does 
not necessarily concern the functional urban areas. Means of integration of the 
municipalities in the urban areas should be investigated. Third, it would be 
worthwhile to explore the true potentials of the larger cities by national and 
international comparisons e.g. by means of data envelopment analysis. It is a quite 
reasonable assumption that there must be plenty of room for improvement in their 
technical efficiency. And fourth, the effects of proactive urban policy should be 
evaluated. As to competition policy, the emphasis should be on efficiency 
improvements in the field of the local private markets. The effects and means of 
structural and growth policy should be studied with particular interest. 
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Figure 1: Potential and actual welfare in a city  
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 Figure 2: Market equilibrium with large cities 
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Figure 3: Competitive dynamics in the case of small cities 
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Figure 4: The case of asymmetric welfare potentials 
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